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REINING IN THE ROGUE EMPLOYEE:  THE 
FOURTH CIRCUIT LIMITS EMPLOYEE 
LIABILITY UNDER THE CFAA 
DANIELLE E. SUNBERG* 
The Fourth Circuit’s opinion in WEC Carolina Energy LLC v. Miller 
reflects a growing trend among the courts to adopt a narrow code 
approach to employee liability under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. 
The case exacerbates the existing circuit split and reinforces the need for 
reconciling when an employee accesses a computer “without 
authorization.”  While resolution from the judiciary remains remote, 
Congress is engaged in a lively debate over the proper interpretation of the 
term “without authorization.”  Recent legislative proposals suggest that 
Congress has united in support of limiting liability for unauthorized access 
under the CFAA to the circumvention of technological barriers.  Support 
for this restrictive interpretation signifies that until the ambiguity in the law 
is clarified, future undecided courts should follow in the Fourth Circuit’s 
footsteps and adopt the code approach to determine employee liability 
under the CFAA. 
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On January 2, 2013, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for writ of 
certiorari in WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller,1 leaving 
unresolved the vexing question of employee liability under the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act2 (CFAA).  The case involved Mike Miller, former 
Project Director for WEC Carolina Energy Solutions (WEC), who used 
WEC’s proprietary information to benefit a competing business.3  WEC 
permitted Miller to access the company’s confidential and trade secret 
documents stored on his employer-provided laptop computer.4  On April 
30, 2010, only twenty days after resigning from his position with WEC, 
Miller used the confidential information to make a pitch to a potential 
client on behalf of a competitor, Arc Energy Services, Inc. (Arc).5  Arc won 
the client’s business, and WEC sued Miller and another participating 
colleague, asserting nine state-law charges as well as several violations of 
the CFAA.6 
The CFAA, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030, is the nation’s first and leading 
cybercrime statute.  The statute grants employers a private right of action to 
hold employees liable for accessing a company computer “without 
authorization” or for “exceeding authorized access.”7  Penalizing this 
conduct grows more imperative:  a 2009 study conducted by the Ponemon 
Institute revealed that six out of every ten departing employees steal 
company data and described this figure as a growing problem of “malicious 
insiders.”8  Unsurprisingly, following this expansion in the computer 
                                                          
 1. 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013) (dismissing the petition pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 46.1, 
which requires dismissal when all parties file an agreement to dismiss the case), dismissing 
cert. from 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 2. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006 & Supp. V 2012)). 
 3. WEC, 687 F.3d at 201, cert. dismissed, 133 S. Ct. 831. 
 4. Id. at 202. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)–(2), (4), (g) (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
 8. See Brian Krebs, Data Theft Common by Departing Employees, WASH. POST (Feb. 
26, 2009, 12:  15 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/ 
02/26/AR2009022601821.html (reporting that the most frequently taken information 
includes e-mail lists, non-financial business data, customer contact lists, and employee 
records); Maggie Shiels, Workers ‘Stealing Company Data,’ BBC NEWS (Feb. 23, 2009, 
2:12 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7902989.stm (suggesting that malicious 
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protection statute, employers have increasingly used the CFAA as a means 
to hold rogue employees accountable for using information obtained from a 
company computer in a manner that conflicts with the employer’s interests. 
WEC attempted to hold Miller liable under the CFAA precisely for his 
misuse of the company’s confidential data.9  The Fourth Circuit affirmed 
that WEC failed to file a viable claim under the CFAA because WEC did 
not “allege that Miller . . . accessed a computer or information on a 
computer without authorization.”10  This decision exacerbates the existing 
circuit split with respect to applying the CFAA to the employer-employee 
context.  The Fourth Circuit aligns itself with the Ninth Circuit, which has 
adopted the narrow code approach to interpreting employee liability under 
the CFAA.11  In contrast, the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have 
embraced a broader and more employer-friendly approach.12  The widening 
division among the circuits creates enormous problems for employers, as 
the CFAA’s mandate directly affects what types of employee actions are 
culpable and what computer authorization protections the employer must 
implement to protect against intellectual property theft.  Many scholars and 
commentators hoped that the Supreme Court would grant writ of certiorari 
to hear WEC  and thus provide guidance to employers and unify the 
courts.13  Such resolution, however, remains elusive—on January 2, 2013, 
                                                          
insiders are motivated to steal the information for a variety of reasons, including “to get a 
new job, start their own businesses or for revenge”); see also Kevin Parrish, Ex-Intel 
Employee Jailed for Stealing Company Secrets, TOM’S HARDWARE (Aug. 9, 2012, 5:20 
PM), http://www.tomshardware.com/news/ 
Biswamohan-Pani-Intel-AMD-Prison-FBI,16771.html (recounting the case of a former Intel 
employee who was sentenced to three years in prison and two years of probation, as well as 
given a $17,500 fine, for downloading company secrets worth an estimated $200 to $400 
million). 
 9. WEC, 687 F.3d at 202. 
 10. Id. at 207 (emphasis added). 
 11. See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) 
(interpreting the CFAA’s “exceeds authorized access” language narrowly to encompass only 
improper access to information, not violations of use restriction); see also infra Part I.B.3 
(describing the narrow, pro-employee code approach). 
 12. See United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263–64 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding 
that a Social Security Administration employee exceeded his authorized access when he 
violated the Administration’s computer-use policy by using databases for non-business 
purposes), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2166 (2011); United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 271 
(5th Cir. 2010) (affirming that the employee’s authorization did not extend to using the 
accessed information to perpetrate a fraud), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct 1237 (2013); Int’l 
Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420–21 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding that the 
employee’s authorization automatically terminated when he breached his duty of loyalty and 
his agency relationship with the company). 
 13. See Russell Beck, CFAA:   The Wait for the Supreme Court Continues, FAIR 
COMPETITION L. (Jan. 6, 2013), http://faircompetitionlaw.com/2013/01/06/cfaa-the-wait-for-
the-supreme-court-continues (expressing disappointment that WEC’s petition for writ of 
certiorari was dismissed and hoping that another case will soon afford the Supreme Court an 
opportunity to resolve the circuit split); Orin Kerr, Thoughts on the Oral Arguments in 
United States v. Nosal, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 19, 2011, 12:46 AM), 
http://www.volokh.com/2011/12/19/thoughts-on-the-oral-arguments-in-united-states-v-
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the Court dismissed WEC’s petition for certiorari.14  In the midst of the 
jurisprudential confusion, Congress seeks to amend the CFAA to mitigate 
some of the statutory interpretation issues at the heart of the circuit split.15 
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s dismissal of WEC, this Note 
explores the deepening circuit split that has engulfed the debate over 
employee liability under the CFAA as well as the potential future 
developments of the CFAA.  Part I of this Note follows the development of 
the CFAA and the divergence among the courts’ approaches to interpreting 
“without authorization.”  Part II discusses the practical implications of the 
Fourth Circuit’s decision in WEC on employers who seek to hold rogue 
employees accountable.  Part III compares the multiple congressional 
attempts to reconcile the ambiguity in the statute and argues that despite 
Congress’s inability to enact an amendment, the legislative proposals 
indicate that Congress has endorsed the Fourth Circuit’s narrow code 
approach to interpreting employee liability under the CFAA. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Until the 1980s, the United States had no specific federal legislation 
addressing cybersecurity and computer crimes.16  In 1984, Congress 
addressed the growing integration of computers into everyday life and the 
increasingly critical component they played in national security, financial 
transactions, and information sharing by passing the Comprehensive Crime 
Control Act, the first iteration of the CFAA.17  Since its enactment, 
                                                          
nosal/ (asserting that the issue of whether the CFAA criminalizes violations of use policies 
has “caused so much uncertainty in the lower courts” that Supreme Court review may be 
justified unless Congress steps in to clarify the definition of “exceeds authorized access”); 
Thomas O’Toole, Cyberlaw Predictions:  High Court Dismissal of WEC Carolina Energy 
Solutions Petition Will Sting, BLOOMBERG BNA (Jan. 4, 2013), 
http://www.bna.com/cyberlaw-predictions-high-b17179871695/ (noting that the Court’s 
petition dismissal “dashed the hopes” of a number of expert attorneys  eager for a circuit 
split resolution). 
 14. WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013), dismissing 
cert. from 687 F.3d 199. 
 15. See Cyber Crime Protection Security Act, S. 2111, 112th Cong. § 8 (2012) 
(proposing to expressly exclude from CFAA liability any access violating a non-
governmental employer’s acceptable use policy if it is the sole basis for the unauthorized 
access allegation); REP. ZOE LOFGREN, 113TH CONG., AARON’S LAW MODIFIED DRAFT § 2 
(2013), available at http://lofgren.house.gov/images/stories/pdf/ 
aarons%20law%20revised%20draft%20013013.pdf (proposing to amend the CFAA by 
excluding violations of employer use policies from the meaning of “access without 
authorization” and by removing the “exceeds authorized access” language altogether). 
 16. Matthew Kapitanyan, Beyond WarGames:  How the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act Should Be Interpreted in the Employment Context, 7 I/S:  J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 
405, 409 (2012); see Obie Okuh, Comment, When Circuit Breakers Trip:  Resetting the 
CFAA to Combat Rogue Employee Access, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 637, 647 (2011) 
(“Prior to 1984, Congress and the courts had relied on mail-and-wire fraud statutes to 
combat computer crimes, but this proved to be an inadequate mechanism . . . .”). 
 17. Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
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Congress has amended the CFAA several times in an attempt to expand its 
mandate, incorporating criminal and civil penalties for improper access to 
both government and private computers.18  Despite the multiple rounds of 
amendments and modifications, the CFAA continues to be plagued by 
statutory interpretation and constitutional vagueness concerns.19 
A. Development of the CFAA 
Congress enacted the initial version of the CFAA in 1984, which 
included the original mandate for law enforcement to protect against 
computer hackers attempting to infiltrate and obtain national security 
information, sensitive information contained in financial records, or access 
a government computer.20  Legislative history reveals that the House 
enacted the provision because “traditional theft/larceny statutes [we]re not 
the proper vehicle to control the spate of computer abuse and computer 
assisted crimes.”21  Although a substantial step, enforcing only these 
limited crimes did not provide a comprehensive statute for cybercrime 
prosecution. 
Congress’s narrow focus in its first endeavor to criminalize computer 
crimes has led to multiple amendments addressing the increasing scope of 
cybercrimes, creating “one of the most far-reaching criminal laws in the 
United States Code.”22  In 1986, Congress overhauled the statute and added 
three new felony offenses.23  Similar to the traditional crime of wire fraud, 
                                                          
No. 98-473, §§ 2102–2103, 98 Stat. 2190, 2190–92 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 
1030 (2006 & Supp. V 2012)); see H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 8 (1984) (attributing the 
passage of the statute to the ubiquity of computers in both the private and public sectors and 
the surge of crimes committed electronically). 
 18. See, e.g., Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) (expanding coverage from only 
federal interest computers to any protected computers); Computer Abuse Amendments Act 
of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. XXIX, 108 Stat. 2097 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1030 (2006 & Supp. V 2012)). 
 19. See Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 
MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1572, 1574 (2010) (emphasizing that the CFAA’s expansion has led to 
vagueness challenges that the statute neither gives fair notice to citizens about what conduct 
is prohibited, nor “establish[es] minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement”); Andrew 
T. Hernacki, Comment, A Vague Law in A Smartphone World:  Limiting the Scope of 
Unauthorized Access Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1543, 
1563 (2012) (arguing that the vagueness challenges arise from the unsettled definitions of 
“authorization” and “access”); Letter from Laura W. Murphy, Dir., Wash. Legislative 
Office, ACLU, et al., to Senate Judiciary Comm. (Sept. 21, 2011), available at 
https://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/CFAA_signon_ltr_2.pdf (“Our primary concern—that this 
will lead to overbroad application of the law—is far from hypothetical.”). 
 20. Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-473, § 2102(a), 98 Stat. 2190, 2190–91 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 
1030(a)(1)–(3) (2006 & Supp. V 2012)).  The statute was renamed the CFAA in 1986.  
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213. 
 21. H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 9 (1984). 
 22. Kerr, supra note 19, at 1561. 
 23. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, § 2(d), 100 Stat. 1213, 1213–
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§ 1030(a)(4) criminalizes unauthorized access with intent to defraud.24  The 
second felony, codified at § 1030(a)(5), prohibits altering, damaging, or 
destroying another’s data without authorization.25  The third addition is 
subsection 1030(a)(6), which criminalizes tracking computer passwords.26  
In addition, the Computer Abuse Amendments Act of 1994 amended the 
CFAA by providing a private right of action in § 1030(g) for victims of 
CFAA offenses to recover damages in a civil suit.27 
Liability under the CFAA requires a person to violate one of the 
enumerated offenses by accessing a computer either “without 
authorization” or by “exceeding authorized access.”28  While Congress has 
not provided a definition for “without authorization,” it has clarified that 
“exceeds authorized access” means “to access a computer with 
authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the 
computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter.”29  The 
purposeful inclusion of the two distinct phrases in different sections of the 
CFAA indicates that Congress intended to target different groups of 
people.30  Those “without authorization” are non-employee “outsiders” 
                                                          
14 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4)–(6) (2006 & Supp. V 2012)). 
 24. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2006) (“Whoever knowingly and with intent to defraud, 
accesses a protected computer without authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by 
means of such conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of value, unless the 
object of the fraud and the thing obtained consists only of the use of the computer and the 
value of such use is not more than $5,000 in any 1-year period . . . shall be punished . . . .”). 
 25. Id. § 1030(a)(5)(A) (Supp. V 2012) (“Whoever . . . knowingly causes the 
transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, 
intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer . . . shall be 
punished . . . .”). 
 26. Id. § 1030(a)(6) (“[K]nowingly and with intent to defraud traffics (as defined 
in section 1029) in any password or similar information through which a computer may be 
accessed without authorization, if (A) such trafficking affects interstate or foreign 
commerce; or (B) such computer is used by or for the Government of the United States . . . 
.”). 
 27. Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. XXIX, 108 Stat. 2097 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 
1030 (2006 & Supp. V 2012)).  Also notable is the expansion of “protected computers” 
under the PATRIOT ACT of 2001 and the Identity Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act 
of 2008 to include virtually all computers.  Pub. L. No. 110-326, tit. II, 122 Stat. 3560 
(codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030, 2332b, 3663 (2006 & Supp. V 2012)); Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 28. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)–(6) (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
 29. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (2006).  The amendment also provided that access must be 
knowing or intentional, indicating that negligent or accidental access is not actionable under 
the CFAA.  Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, § 2(a), 100 Stat. 
1213, 1213; see Shawn E. Tuma, “What Does CFAA Mean and Why Should I Care?”—A 
Primer on the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act for Civil Litigators, 63 S.C. L. REV. 141, 
172–73 & n.252 (2011) (stating that accidental or mistaken access does not violate the 
CFAA and providing the example of a case in which the defendant’s unauthorized but 
“mistaken origination of the plaintiff’s bank account” did not constitute a CFAA violation). 
 30. See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (reasoning 
that if the phrases refer to two separate groups of hackers—as opposed to one referring to 
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who hack into the computer, whereas those who “exceed authorized 
access” are considered employee “insiders” who are permitted to use or 
access the computer to a certain extent.31 
Although Congress originally considered “insiders” and “outsiders” from 
the perspective of protecting national security secrets and not in the 
employer-employee context, the distinction directly translates to the rogue 
employee scenario that has become increasingly common in CFAA 
lawsuits.32  Despite Congress’s clear intentions to target different groups of 
people through these terms, significant litigation has arisen from confusion 
over the definition and scope of employee “authorization.”33  The following 
section provides an overview of the deepening circuit split that has resulted 
from this confusion. 
B. Approaches to Employee Liability Under the CFAA 
Over the last decade, the circuit courts have diverged in their approach to 
balancing employees’ rights and obligations granted by their authorization 
with protecting employers’ confidential information, resulting in a three-
way circuit split.  Depending on which one of the three developed theories 
a court adopts, the definition of “without authorization” shifts to benefit 
either the employee or the employer.  Consequently, the jurisdiction in 
which the employer chooses to file suit influences who will likely prevail, 
and thereby encourages forum shopping.34 
                                                          
hackers and the other referring to people who misuse accessed information—the focus of 
the CFAA properly remains on hacking “rather than turning it into a sweeping Internet-
policing mandate”). 
 31. Id.; see United States v. Phillips, 477 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2007) (explaining that 
Congress “condition[ed] the nature of the intrusion in part on the level of authorization a 
computer user possesses” and specifically aimed § 1030(a)(3) and (a)(5) at outsiders and § 
1030(a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(4) at both insiders and outsiders (citing S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 
11 (1996); S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 10 (1986))). 
 32. ROBERT B. FITZPATRICK, COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT:  CURRENT 
DEVELOPMENTS 1 (2010), available at http://www.robertbfitzpatrick.com/papers/cfaa 
CurrentDevelopments.pdf (noting that the increased use of the CFAA in the employment 
context was made possible by the Act’s sweeping definition of “protected computer,” which 
could arguably encompass any computer that is connected to the internet and owned by an 
employer); see also Douglas A. Winthrop, How Broad is the Reach of the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act?  The Circuits Diverge, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 2013:  TOP 
LAWYERS ON TRENDS AND KEY STRATEGIES FOR THE UPCOMING YEAR 121 (2013). 
 33. See Tuma, supra note 29, at 17882 (reviewing the nuanced approaches the courts 
of appeals for the First, Fifth, Eleventh, and Ninth Circuits have taken on the 
“authorization” issue). 
 34. See  Alan Nicgorski, Employees Exceeding Authorized Access?  Trends in 
Interpreting the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, WESTLAW J. COMPUTER & INTERNET, Feb. 
8, 2013, at 1, 5–6 (discussing lessons for employers when seeking redress against 
employees); Winthrop, supra note 32, at 121. 
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1. Pro-employer:  Agency approach 
The agency approach to interpreting employee liability under the CFAA 
embodies the notion that the authorization is defined by the employee’s use 
of information.35  The Seventh Circuit adopted and solidified this approach 
in the civil suit, International Airport Centers, LLC v. Citrin.36  Citrin 
involved an employee-defendant who deleted an enormous amount of data 
from his company’s computer and subsequently went into business for 
himself in breach of his employment contract.37  Instead of focusing on 
whether Citrin had permission to access the computer, the court focused on 
Citrin’s motivation to delete the files.  While recognizing that “[t]he 
difference between ‘without authorization’ and ‘exceeding authorized 
access’ is paper thin,” Judge Posner pronounced that Citrin’s authorization 
automatically terminated when he decided to go into business for himself 
and “resolved to destroy files that incriminated himself and other files that 
were also the property of his employer, in violation of the duty of 
loyalty.”38  By considering Citrin’s motivation, the court adopted a 
permissive and broad interpretation of “authorization” that advantages the 
employer. 
Citrin was sued by his employer under § 1030(a)(5), which is violated 
when a person “knowingly causes the transmission of a program, 
information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, 
intentionally causes damage without authorization.”39  To trigger liability 
in a section aimed solely at non-employee “outsiders,” the court needed to 
characterize Citrin’s actions in a manner that terminated his authorization.  
Focusing on legislative intent, Judge Posner pointed to Congress’s concern 
with attacks by both hackers and “disgruntled programmers who decide to 
trash the employer’s data system on the way out.”40  In an attempt to 
reconcile the apparent conflict that Congress characterized employees as 
“insiders” who “exceed authorized access” while targeting solely those 
“without authorization” in § 1030(a)(5), the Seventh Circuit adopted the 
broad agency approach.41  The far-reaching interpretation of “without 
                                                          
 35. See Int’l Airport Centers, LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420–21 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(asserting that the employee’s purpose to misuse the information constituted a breach of the 
duty of loyalty, which terminated the agency relationship between the employee and the 
employer, and in turn ended the employee’s authorization to access that information, even 
though he had previously been authorized to access it while still in the agency relationship). 
 36. 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 37. Id. at 419 (explaining that the employee, Citrin, not only deleted the files from the 
computer, but also uploaded a “secure-erasure program” to overwrite the deleted files, 
thereby preventing his employer from recovering them). 
 38. Id. at 420; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006) (outlining the duty 
of loyalty in agency law requiring agents to act in the interests of the principal). 
 39. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) (Supp. V 2012) (emphasis added). 
 40. Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420. 
 41. Id.; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 112 (1958) (“Unless otherwise 
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authorization” allowed the court to hold accountable a rogue employee who 
misused the information he was permitted to access and severely damaged 
his employer.42 
2. Pro-employer:  Contract approach 
The First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits have adopted the contract 
approach to interpreting “without authorization” under the CFAA.  Under 
the contract approach, an employer can restrict the employee’s 
authorization to access a computer through an employer-employee 
agreement or policy, such as an employment, confidentiality, or terms of 
service (TOS) agreement.43  Therefore, any information obtained from a 
computer that exceeds the scope of the agreements thereby exceeds or 
terminates the employee’s authorization under the CFAA.44 
Courts have applied the contract approach in a similar manner as the 
agency theory; thus, they are sometimes characterized as a singular 
approach.45  Opposite from the narrow and more employee-friendly code 
approach, which ignores the employee’s motivation to access computer 
information,46 both the agency and contract approaches focus on the 
purpose for using the information and whether the employer has proscribed 
such use.  For example, the First Circuit in EF Cultural Travel BV v. 
Explorica, Inc.47 held that disclosure of proprietary information, a breach of 
                                                          
agreed, the authority of an agent terminates if, without knowledge of the principal, he 
acquires adverse interests or if he is otherwise guilty of a serious breach of loyalty to the 
principal.”). 
 42. Only the Seventh Circuit has adopted the agency approach, although district courts 
in other circuits have applied the theory.  Lee Goldman, Interpreting the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act, 13 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 6 & nn.27–28 (2012) (citing examples of 
cases following the broad approach); see, e.g., Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hollander, No. 
C 08-1039, 2010 WL 2851639, at *2 (N.D. Iowa July 20, 2010) (concluding, without 
explanation, that misusing information in a manner contrary to an employer’s interests can 
constitute either access without authorization or access exceeding that which was 
authorized); Guest-Tek Interactive Entm’t, Inc. v. Pullen, 665 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45–46 (D. 
Mass. 2009) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss because First Circuit precedent favors 
the broader agency approach to interpreting “without authorization” and ”exceeding 
authorized access); NCMIC Fin. Corp. v. Artino, 638 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 105758 (S.D. 
Iowa 2009) (adopting the broad view based on the plain text and legislative history of the 
CFAA and because this view best distinguishes between “exceeds authorized access” and 
“unauthorized access”). 
 43. See Goldman, supra note 42, at 7 (asserting that the contract approach allows the 
parties to construe the parameters of authorization). 
 44. See id. at 7 (advising that by accessing or using information outside in violation of 
the employee’s contract, the employee has acquired information that he or she was “not 
entitled to obtain” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 45. See WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 
2012) (combining the agency and contract approaches into one school of thought, 
represented by Citrin and defined by an employee who misuses information in a manner that 
“further[s] interests that are adverse to his employer”), cert. dismissed, 133 S. Ct. 831 
(2013). 
 46. See infra Part I.B.3 (discussing the code approach in the Ninth and Fourth Circuits). 
 47. 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001). 
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the employer’s confidentiality agreement, constituted exceeding authorized 
access under § 1030.48  In United States v. Rodriguez,49 the Eleventh 
Circuit found an employee criminally liable for using information accessed 
through the employer’s computer databases for personal benefit and in 
direct violation of the employer’s policy.50  Similarly, in 2010, the Fifth 
Circuit upheld the criminal convictions in United States v. John.51  The 
defendant, a former Citigroup employee, misused customer account 
information for a fraudulent scheme, thereby exceeding her authorization.52  
The court supported its holding by stating that although the employee was 
authorized to access the customer account information, the use of the 
information was a clear violation of the employer’s policies.53 
3. Pro-employee:  Code approach 
The theory behind the code approach to the CFAA relies on the plain 
meaning canon of statutory interpretation, which provides that “unless 
otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, 
contemporary, common meaning.”54  With this canon in mind, the Ninth 
Circuit first weighed in on the debate about employee liability under the 
CFAA in LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka.55  The court adopted the code 
approach in this civil suit and provided a description for the otherwise 
undefined term “without authorization.”  Invoking the plain meaning 
canon, the court defined “authorization” as “permission,” which indicates 
that an employee acts “without authorization” when the employee lacks the 
requisite password or login credentials to access the employer’s computer 
or the specific information.56  The court recognized the potential misuse of 
the information obtained by the employee; however, the court rejected a 
broad approach as inconsistent with the statute’s plain language, as 
permission has no bearing on information use.57  Instead, the court 
                                                          
 48. See id. at 582–84.  The violation “might reasonably be construed to be contrary to 
the interests of EF.”  Id. at 583. 
 49. 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2166 (2011). 
 50. See id. at 1260–61 (involving an employee of the Social Security Administration 
who accessed, for personal reasons, private information about several women). 
 51. 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1237 (2013). 
 52. Id. at 269. 
 53. See id. at 271–72 (finding that John exceeded her authorized access because her 
actions were both an explicit violation of company policy and part of an illegal scheme that 
was not an intended use of the computer system). 
 54. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979). 
 55. 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009).  Brekka involved an employee who e-mailed a 
number of documents to his and his wife’s personal e-mail accounts to build a competing 
business.  Id. at 1129–30. 
 56. Id. at 1133. 
 57. See id. at 1133–35 (declining to adopt such an expansive interpretation and noting 
the Supreme Court’s cautions against interpreting criminal statutes in ways that impose 
unexpected burdens). 
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employed a narrow interpretation of the statute wherein the user-employee 
can be held liable under the CFAA by circumventing the computer’s 
privileges or passwords to access and obtain information.58 
The Ninth Circuit addressed the issue again, this time in a criminal suit 
in United States v. Nosal,59 which allowed the court to solidify its 
interpretation of the CFAA and further clarify the code approach.  The case 
involved David Nosal, an employee of an executive search firm who 
convinced fellow colleagues to start a competing business.60  Nosal and his 
colleagues used their log-in credentials to obtain proprietary information 
from the employer’s computer, including source lists and contact 
information downloaded from the company’s confidential database.61  The 
government indicted Nosal on multiple counts, including a violation of § 
1030(a)(4) for aiding and abetting his colleagues in exceeding authorized 
access with intent to defraud.62  Although the employees had authorization 
to access the source lists and contact information, the employer had 
implemented a policy that limited use of confidential information solely to 
business purposes.63  Consequently, the employees benefitted from the 
court’s use of the code approach because it ignored the employees’ 
motivations and focused solely on whether the employee had permission to 
access the information.  Had the court adopted the broad agency or contract 
approaches, the government would have most likely prevailed. 
In a rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit affirmed its reversal of the 
district court’s decision and held that Nosal’s and his colleagues’ log-in 
credentials permitted them to access the information, thereby granting them 
authorization under § 1030(a)(4).64  Although the company policy restricted 
the employees’ use of the information, the court held that the purview of 
“the CFAA is limited to violations of restrictions on access to information, 
and not restrictions on its use.”65  Consequently, the court upheld the 
dismissal of the government’s charges of violating the CFAA.66 
                                                          
 58. See id. at 1135 (holding that access without authorization takes place when an 
individual has no permission to use the computer for any purpose, or when an employer 
rescinds an employee’s permission and the employee continues to use the computer). 
 59. 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
 60. Id. at 856. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See id. at 856 & n.1 (detailing that company policy also prohibited employees from 
disclosing confidential information). 
 64. Id. at 864.  On remand, the district court denied Nosal’s motion to dismiss the 
remaining CFAA counts, rejecting his argument that the en banc decision of the case limited 
liability to technical hacking crimes where technological barriers are circumvented.  United 
States v. Nosal, No. CR-08-0237, 2013 WL 978226, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2013).  Nosal 
argued that because the log-in information was voluntarily provided, there could be no 
hacking and thus no liability under the CFAA.  Id. at *9. 
 65. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 864.  The court referenced several lower court opinions that 
illustrate the same plain-meaning interpretation of the CFAA.  See, e.g., Orbit One 
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The court rejected its sister circuits’ broad interpretation of the CFAA 
for several reasons.  First, the court noted that the narrow code approach is 
more faithful to the CFAA’s text and its legislative history, as the statute’s 
“general purpose is to punish hacking—the circumvention of technological 
access barriers—not misappropriation of trade secrets—a subject Congress 
has dealt with elsewhere.”67  The Ninth Circuit substantiated its 
interpretation with the rule of lenity, which requires courts to narrowly 
construe ambiguous criminal statutes to prevent “making criminal law in 
Congress’s stead.”68  The court explained that if Congress intended to hold 
employees accountable for misusing information, “it must speak more 
clearly.”69 
II. THE CODE APPROACH IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE 
A. The Fourth Circuit Adopts the Code Approach 
On July 26, 2012, the Fourth Circuit addressed employee liability in a 
civil context under the CFAA and further divided the courts.  In WEC 
Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller,70 the defendant and WEC’s 
former Project Director, Mike Miller, downloaded confidential documents 
from his company laptop to his personal e-mail account.71  While working 
for WEC, Miller was subject to WEC’s computer-use policies that 
protected its confidential information and trade secrets by prohibiting the 
unauthorized use of the information including downloading it to a non-
WEC computer.72  After resigning, Miller used the information in these 
documents for the benefit of a competitor, Arc.73  WEC sued Miller under § 
1030(a)(2), (a)(4), and (a)(5), contending that by downloading information 
                                                          
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 692 F. Supp. 2d 373, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (advancing 
that “[t]he plain language of the CFAA supports a narrow reading” and adoption of the code 
approach); Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962, 965 (D. Ariz. 2008) (standing 
for the proposition that the CFAA “target[s] the unauthorized procurement or alteration of 
information, not its misuse or misappropriation” (quoting Brett Senior & Assocs., P.C. v. 
Fitzgerald, No. 06-1412, 2007 WL 2043377, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 2007)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Werner-
Masuda, 390 F. Supp. 2d 479, 499 (D. Md. 2005) (asserting that the CFAA does “not 
prohibit the unauthorized disclosure or use of information, but rather unauthorized access”). 
 66. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 864. 
 67. Id. at 863. 
 68. United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008); see Nosal, 676 F.3d at 863 
(explaining that the rule of lenity is a longstanding principle used by courts to look at the 
defendant’s behavior with the understanding that millions of citizens as well as Congress 
must have “fair notice of what conduct [the] laws criminalize”). 
 69. See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 863 (“We construe criminal statutes narrowly so that 
Congress will not unintentionally turn ordinary citizens into criminals.”). 
 70. 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. dismissed, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013). 
 71. Id. at 202. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
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to his personal computer in violation of WEC’s policies, Miller breached 
his duty of loyalty to WEC and thereby either terminated or exceeded his 
authorization to access the computer.74 
Judge Floyd delivered the opinion of the court, rejecting WEC’s 
arguments and finding that employers cannot use the CFAA to impose 
liability on employees for misusing information obtained from a company 
computer when the employee had permission to access and obtain the 
information.75  Agreeing with the district court’s interpretation of the 
CFAA and the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation in its en banc rehearing of 
Nosal, the unanimous three-judge panel held that employees are not 
“without authorization” and do not “exceed[] authorized access” when 
employers have provided them with permission to access a computer.76 
Similar to the Ninth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit had constitutional 
vagueness concerns with respect to the incredibly broad reach of the 
statute.77  The court focused on statutory interpretation and resolved any 
ambiguity in congressional intent through the rule of lenity.78  Because 
Congress did not provide a definition for the term “without authorization,” 
the court turned to the Oxford English Dictionary, which defines 
“authorization” as “formal warrant, or sanction.”79  According to the court, 
this definition suggests that the phrase does not extend to the use of 
                                                          
 74. Id.  WEC argued that Miller’s actions impaired the integrity of the company’s 
computer systems and data, resulting in economic damages of at least $5000.  Id.; see 18 
U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2006) (requiring minimum damages in the amount of $5000 to trigger 
liability under the CFAA). 
 75. WEC, 687 F.3d at 206; see Audra A. Dial & John M. Moye, Fourth Circuit Widens 
Split over CFAA and Employees Violating Computer Use Restrictions, KILPATRICK 
TOWNSEND & STOCKTON LLP (Sept. 10, 2012), 
http://www.kilpatricktownsend.com/en/Knowledge 
_Center/Alerts_and_Podcasts/Legal_Alerts/2012/09/Fourth_Circuit_Widens_Split_Over 
_CFAA_and_Employees_Violating_Computer_Use_Restrictions.aspx (explaining that 
under the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of the CFAA, “the CFAA may be used to impose 
civil liability on employees either who are not permitted to access certain information but do 
so anyway, or who go ‘beyond the bounds’ of their authorized access; however, . . . the 
CFAA’s prohibitions do not impose liability on an employee who has permission to access 
electronic information but then ‘improper[ly] use[s]’ that information” (alterations in 
original) (quoting WEC, 687 F.3d at 204, 207)). 
 76. WEC, 687 F.3d at 206.  Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the U.S. District Court for the 
District of South Carolina dismissed the government’s CFAA claim and rejected the Fifth 
Circuit’s broad interpretation of the CFAA in United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 
2010), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1237 (2013).  WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. 
Miller, No. 0:10-cv-2775, 2011 WL 379458 (D.S.C. Feb. 3, 2011), aff’d 687 F.3d 199, cert. 
dismissed, 133 S. Ct. 831.  Adopting a narrow reading of the statute, the district court found 
that an employee acts “without authorization” and triggers liability only when an employee 
accesses a computer without permission, which Miller possessed.  Id. at *4–5. 
 77. WEC, 687 F.3d at 206 (agreeing with the Nosal court that Congress did not intend 
for a CFAA violation and imposing criminal penalties when an employee violates a use 
policy). 
 78. Id. at 204–06. 
 79. Id. at 204. 
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information that is otherwise accessed with authorization.80  Following in 
the footsteps of the Ninth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the 
broad interpretation of the CFAA conflicts with the rule of lenity and 
imposes a harsh interpretation that could find millions of unsuspecting 
employees subject to criminal sanctions.81  The court rationalized that the 
agency and contract approaches would inadvertently trap employees and 
find them criminally liable for technically violating a company policy 
through innocuous activity, such as e-mailing work to a personal computer 
for the purpose of working from home or using the computer to check 
Facebook or the scores of a football game.82 
B. WEC Impacts Employers and Rogue Employees 
By handing down its opinion in WEC, the Fourth Circuit intensified the 
debate over employee liability under the CFAA that continues to plague the 
courts.  The court recognized that the opinion will “disappoint employers 
hoping for a means to rein in rogue employees,” as the WEC decision does, 
in fact, have significant repercussions on employers seeking to bring claims 
against their employees.83 
WEC has significant implications for employers and how they draft their 
computer policies.  Employers enjoy having the CFAA in their arsenal of 
statutes used to charge rogue employees because (1) it immediately 
provides the option of bringing suit in federal court and (2) it is easier to 
prove the elements of CFAA charges than trade secret claims.84  As the 
CFAA provides subject matter jurisdiction to bring suit in the federal court 
system, the employers need only determine which venue is proper.85  The 
appropriate federal circuit will determine the level of control the 
employer’s policy has over the employee.  With potential litigation in 
mind, employers are able to craft broad use policies that ensnare 
employees, turning them into potential felons.  If an employer is able to 
bring suit in a circuit that has adopted the contract or agency approach, then 
the policy dictates liability.  As a result, the broad approaches to employee 
                                                          
 80. Id. 
 81. See id. at 205–06 (concluding that a harsher interpretation would have “far-reaching 
effects unintended by Congress”). 
 82. See id. at 206 (emphasizing that an employee who e-mails work to a personal 
computer “has no intent to defraud his employer.”); United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 
860 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (stating that “[m]inds have wandered since the beginning of 
time,” and “minor daliances” such as g-chatting and online shopping may be in violation of 
company use policies and subject unwary employees to criminal liability)  
 83. WEC , 687 F.3d at 207. 
 84. See Nicgorski, supra note 34, at 5 (emphasizing that attorneys in the Seventh Circuit 
should include CFAA charges in their “arsenal” of claims against rogue employees, while 
such cases would collapse in the Fourth and Ninth Circuits). 
 85. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2006). 
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liability under the CFAA allow private contracts to dictate federal law.86  
The CFAA in large measure protects national security and private 
companies who oversee the country’s infrastructure—surely Congress did 
not intend for private contracts to trump the federal statute. 
WEC suggests that, at least in a growing number of circuits, the rise in 
employer actions against employees for trade secret misappropriation 
claims as well as other computer fraud claims may significantly decrease.  
For example, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 
agreed with the Fourth Circuit’s narrow interpretation in JBCHoldings NY, 
LLC v. Pakter.87  In Pakter, the employer sued the defendant-employee for 
breaching her employment contract by using proprietary information 
obtained through the company computer to set up a competing business.88  
The court recounted the opposing approaches to interpreting employee 
liability under the CFAA, noting that the district courts have adopted both 
views because the Second Circuit had not yet weighed in on the issue.89  
Citing to WEC, the court adopted the code approach, finding it 
“considerably more persuasive.”90 
As the CFAA becomes a less viable option, employers will need to find 
alternative theories to hold employees accountable (e.g., contractual, tort, 
and state statutory remedies).91  The CFAA may only protect employers 
against circumvention of technological barriers to proprietary information, 
requiring additional provisions to protect against the misuse of such 
information.92  These limitations on employee liability indicate that the 
statute requires further consideration and modification to provide a holistic 
protection mechanism.  However, because the Supreme Court has 
dismissed the case, any resolution through the judiciary remains elusive.  
Consequently, any immediate clarification of the definition and the scope 
of the term “authorization” must emerge from the legislature. 
                                                          
 86. See Letter from Laura W. Murphy, Dir., Wash. Legislative Office, ACLU, et al., to 
House Comm. on the Judiciary (Apr. 2, 2013), available at https://www.eff.org/sites/ 
default/files/cfaa_letter_to_judiciary.pdf; Letter from Laura W. Murphy et al. to Senate 
Judiciary Comm., supra note 19. 
 87. No. 12 Civ. 7555, 2013 WL 1149061 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2013). 
 88. Id. at *2. 
 89. Id. at *4–5. 
 90. Id. at *5. 
 91. See id. at *7 (finding that the broad agency approach “create[s] a federal cause of 
action for incidents and injuries traditionally governed by state contract and tort laws”); see 
also Nosal, 676 F.3d at 859–60 (explaining that interpreting “exceeds authorized use” 
broadly transforms contract and tort law claims into federal crimes). 
 92. See e.g., Nicgorski, supra note 34, at 5 (raising legislative amendments that limit 
liability by precluding violations of use policies). 
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III. RECENT LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS REFLECT THE CODE APPROACH 
Congress is considering several legislative proposals intended to resolve 
the ambiguities in the CFAA.  In September 2011, the Senate Judiciary 
Committee supported an amendment to the CFAA sponsored by Senators 
Chuck Grassley (R-IA), Al Franken (D-MN), and Mike Lee (R-UT) 
(“Grassley/Franken/Lee amendment”), which addressed the constitutional 
vagueness concern illustrated by the Fourth Circuit.93  This bipartisan 
amendment shielded employees from liability under the CFAA for 
violations of TOS agreements and company policies.94  In effect, the 
Grassley/Franken/Lee amendment adopted the narrow code approach and 
at least in part solves the problem discussed in WEC and Nosal in which 
employees unwittingly expose themselves to liability under the CFAA by 
downloading information to their personal computers or by checking the 
weather and the latest news headlines.95  This legislative effort, however, 
left unresolved if and how employers could hold rogue employees 
accountable for accessing information that is then used for purposes that 
conflict with the interests of their employer, as was the case in WEC and 
Citrin. 
On February 15, 2012, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), proposed a more comprehensive CFAA 
amendment called the Cyber Crime Protection Security Act,96 which 
attempted to place limitations on the types of information that must be 
obtained by the employee to trigger liability and to clarify the term 
“exceeds authorized access.”97  Additionally, the amendment sought to 
                                                          
 93. See S. REP. NO. 112-91, at 12 (2011) (recounting the approval of the Committee to 
narrow the definition of “exceeds authorized access” in the CFAA). 
 94. Id.; see Letter from Laura W. Murphy et al. to Senate Judiciary Comm., supra note 
19 (indicating that the amendment would “fix a large part of the overbreadth problem in the 
CFAA”); Greg Nojeim & Jake Laperruque, Why Fibbing About Your Age Is Irrelevant to 
the Cybersecurity Bill, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (July 30, 2012), 
https://www.cdt.org/blogs/greg-nojeim/3007why-fibbing-about-your-age-relevant-cyber 
security-bill (calling the Franken/Grassley/Lee amendment “an important step forward for 
security and civil liberties” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 95. See S. REP. NO. 112–91, at 12 (noting that the amendment would exclude from the 
CFAA liability conduct that only involves a TOS violation); Laura W. Murphy et al. to 
Senate Judiciary Comm., supra note 19 (stating that the amendment would remove the 
possibility of felony prosecutions where TOS violations are the sole basis to determine 
whether access was authorized); see also WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 
687 F.3d 199, 206 (4th Cir. 2012) (explaining the problem with an agency approach that 
would remove an employee’s authorization instantaneously for viewing Facebook or 
checking sports scores), cert. dismissed, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013). 
 96. S. 2111, 112th Cong. § 8 (2012) (including some provisions previously approved by 
the Senate Judiciary Committee in the Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2011, S. 
1151, 112th Cong. (as reported by the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Sept. 22, 2011)). 
 97. See id. §§ 4, 8 (providing examples of trafficking in passwords as one type of 
information to trigger liability, and excluding contractual or terms of service violations from 
the definition of unauthorized access). 
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impose harsher penalties for CFAA violations, including an added asset 
forfeiture provision and an “aggravated damage” section.98  In July 2012, 
Leahy submitted the Cyber Crime Protection Security Act, along with four 
additional amendments, to the Cybersecurity Act, a bill already in 
deliberations by the Senate.99  The Department of Justice (DOJ) supported 
Leahy’s changes to enhance penalties, but opposed the narrow code 
approach to interpreting authorization included in section 8 of the 
amendment, which would limit the government’s prosecutorial authority.100 
The bill faced opposition from several Republican senators as well as the 
prominent U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and despite aggressive support 
from the White House, it ultimately failed in the Senate by a 52–46 vote to 
end debate and move forward with legislation.101  Those who voted in favor 
of the bill remarked that instead of focusing on the pressing need to 
increase cybersecurity and the pleas from the Executive branch to increase 
the nation’s safety, the bill became “another vehicle for partisan ideological 
shots.”102   
The Senate may also consider the Republicans’ competing proposal, the 
                                                          
 98. Id. §§ 6–7. 
 99. 158 CONG. REC. S5404 (daily ed. July 25, 2012).  The four additional amendments 
are SA 2576, 2577, 2578, and 2580.  The revised Cybersecurity Act of 2012 with these 
amendments (and others) is the “Revised Cybersecurity Act of 2012” or “CSA2012.”  S. 
3414, 112th Cong. (2012). 
 100. See  Cyber Crime:  Updating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act To Protect Cyber 
Space and Combat Emerging Threats:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
112th Cong. 6 (2011) (statement of James Baker, Associate Deputy Att’y Gen of the United 
States) (“[R]estricting the statute [by prohibiting claims bases solely upon a violation of 
terms of use or contractual agreements] would make it difficult or impossible to deter and 
address serious insider threats through prosecution.”); Personal Data Privacy and Security 
Act of 2011, S. 1151, 112th Cong. § 110 (as reported by the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
Sept. 22, 2011) (incorporating the proposed Grassley/Franken/Lee amendment and limiting 
the definition of unauthorized use to exclude any violation of use policy or TOS 
agreements); Nojeim & Laperruque, supra note 94 (indicating that the DOJ opposes the 
Grassley/Franken/Lee amendment portion proposed by Senator Leahy); see also Orin Kerr, 
Recent Developments—Both in the Courts and in Congress—on the Scope of the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 30, 2012, 11:35 PM), 
http://www.volokh.com/2012/ 
07/30/recent-developments-both-in-the-courts-and-in-congress-on-the-scope-of-the-com 
puter-fraud-and-abuse-act (noting that the DOJ supported various amendments, including 
the asset forfeiture and additional punitive damages provisions). 
 101. Ramsey Cox & Jennifer Martinez, Cybersecurity Act Fails Senate Vote, HILL (Aug. 
2, 2012, 10:36 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/241851-
cybersecurity-act-fails-to-advance-in-senate (reporting that the bill required 60 votes to 
continue and quoting the White House Press Secretary’s characterization of the bill’s failure 
as “a profound disappointment”). 
 102. Id. (addressing Republican Senators’ belief that the bill placed too heavy of a 
burden on the business community to improve their private cyber infrastructures).  
Following Congress’s failure to pass legislation, President Obama signed a Cybersecurity 
Executive Order that promotes strengthened cyber defenses for the nation’s infrastructure 
and information sharing between the public and private sectors.  Improving Critical 
Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739 (Feb. 12, 2013).  
This executive order, however, does not impact any privacy laws and regulations. 
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SECURE IT Act of 2012,103 which provides more consideration from the 
business community.104  The SECURE IT Act, supported by Senators John 
McCain (R-AZ) and Kay Bailey Hutchinson (R-TX), includes the same 
code approach to defining “exceeds authorize access” as included in the 
Grassley/Franken/Lee amendment and Senator Leahy’s proposal.105  
Although the bill has not yet been considered in the Senate, it will most 
likely face the same opposition from the DOJ as the Cybersecurity Act for 
limiting prosecutorial discretion.  If Congress cannot find a balance with 
respect to who bears the burden of implementing cybersecurity measures to 
prevent hacking, then enacting legislation remains as out of reach as 
judicial resolution. 
A compromised solution may lie in “Aaron’s Law,” a legislative effort 
drafted by Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren (D-CA).106  The new bill follows 
the death of Aaron Swartz, an Internet activist who downloaded millions of 
articles in violation of JSTOR’s TOS agreement and faced thirteen felony 
charges, including several violations of the CFAA.107  Faced with the 
possibility of spending thirty-five years in prison, Swartz committed 
suicide before trial was set to begin.108  Swartz’s tragic death incited 
Internet activists and lawmakers who believe that the government had 
overreached its prosecutorial authority and brought disproportionate 
charges against Swartz. 
The public outcry resulted in Aaron’s Law, which seeks to eliminate 
vagueness concerns by tightening the overbroad language of the CFAA.109  
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Lofgren proposes amending the CFAA by eliminating the term “exceeds 
authorized access,” which may have required the court to dismiss the 
government’s CFAA charges against Swartz, had it been in effect.110  The 
resulting language of the bill circumvents the interpretation issue of 
“exceeds authorized access” addressed in Grassley/Franken/Lee 
amendment and the Cybersecurity Act by eliminating the term from the 
CFAA entirely.111  In addition, the current version of Aaron’s law 
eliminates violations of TOS agreements and breaches of contract from the 
statute’s mandate.112 
Lofgren may hope to have the amendment pass swiftly in both houses, 
but the bill may stall due to similar resistance faced by the previous 
efforts.113  Swartz’ death has reignited bipartisan efforts to amend the 
CFAA and competing bills are in circulation, although they are in the early 
drafting stages.114  Each legislative proposal has faced fierce opposition 
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from Congress, agencies, and the business community.  Republicans want 
to block legislation that they fear is too onerous on the business community 
by forcing businesses to carry the burden of securing their computer 
systems and data.  Most recently, a group of organizations and individuals 
including the ACLU, Electronic Frontier Foundation, and Professor Orin 
Kerr wrote a letter to Congress opposing Aaron’s Law.115  They warn that 
the draft actually expands the scope of the Act by increasing penalties and 
increasing “the scope of conduct punishable,” including adding computer 
crimes as a form of racketeering.116 
Notwithstanding Congress’s inability to pass a clarifying amendment, 
the similarities in its several proposals are revealing.117  Despite the 
political disagreement over the practical implementation of cybersecurity 
safety measures, proponents of all four bills supported restricting the 
interpretation of “exceeds authorized access” in their amendments, 
suggesting that Congress is unified in support of limiting employee 
liability.  Republicans and Democrats read employee liability under the 
CFAA narrowly, precluding from liability employees with permission to 
access their employer’s computer.  Congress supported the narrow 
definition of “exceeds authorized access” originally included in the 
Grassley/Franklin/Lee amendment that precluded liability for  violating a 
contractual agreement, such as a TOS agreement.  The language of this 
legislative proposal was adopted by Leahy’s Cyber Crime Protection 
Security Act, the Cybersecurity Act, McCain and Hutchinson’s SECURE 
IT Act.  Lofgren’s current draft of Aaron’s Law builds upon these attempts 
by eliminating the troublesome term entirely. 
Thus, despite disagreement over many aspects of cybersecurity 
amendments, Congress remains unified about employee liability under the 
statute.  An added motivation for limiting the CFAA’s overbroad reach is 
Congress’s constitutional vagueness concerns pertaining to the DOJ’s 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion when investigating potential charges 
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under the CFAA.118  While the DOJ has stated that it does not intend to 
target employees who unwittingly violate the statute, precedent yields valid 
concern regarding whether the DOJ will abide by this policy.119  By 
continually proposing to amend “exceed authorized access” under § 
1030(e)(6) to preclude any charges based solely on TOS agreement 
violations or contract breaches, Congress has indicated that it agrees with 
the WEC court that the statute in its current form is overbroad.  Until 
Congress passes an amendment or the Supreme Court provides unifying 
guidance, undecided courts in future cases should follow the lead of the 
Fourth and Ninth Circuits and adopt the code approach. 
CONCLUSION 
By entering the debate about employee liability under the CFAA, the 
Fourth Circuit exacerbates the existing circuit split and the need for 
resolution from the Supreme Court or Congress.  Unfortunately, any 
resolution from the judiciary remains a remote possibility, and litigants and 
judges alike must wait for another employee liability case to reach the 
Supreme Court.  Meanwhile, Congress is engaged in a lively debate over 
the proper interpretation of “without authorization” under the CFAA and 
has drafted multiple proposals to reconcile the ambiguities that plague the 
statute.  Although Congress has not yet enacted a bill, it has united with 
respect to limiting liability under the CFAA strictly to obtaining 
information without permission.  The restricting language in these 
legislative efforts indicate that Congress has endorsed the code approach as 
the preferred judicial interpretation of the CFAA. 
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